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Abstract
This paper investigates which factors determine a bank’s decision to expand its
activities abroad and what determines its choice of the countries to invest in. The empirical
analysis is conducted using firm-level data on foreign subsidiaries for a representative
sample of nearly 2,500 OECD banks. The results show that the banks with cross-border
shareholdings are larger and have headquarters in countries with a more developed and
efficient banking market. They prefer to invest in countries where expected profits are larger,
owing to higher expected economic growth and the prospect of reducing local banks’
inefficiency. These factors are overall more important in banks’ decisions than those related
to the degree of openness of the origin country and its economic integration with the
destination country.
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The rapid increase in international trade and cross-border financial transactions in the
last two decades has been coupled, in more recent years, with an expansion in international
banking. This has determined an increase in both the number of acquisitions of foreign banks
and the scale of activity of foreign branches (see, for example, ECB, 1999).
The literature on international banking has considered mainly three kinds of operations
abroad: loan provision and asset and liability management with foreign counterparts, foreign
branching, and the acquisition of shareholdings in foreign banks (subsidiaries).
2 Commonly,
foreign branches are used by parent banks to support the activities of home-country clients
who operate abroad and in order to operate in the leading financial centers (Brealey and
Kaplanis, 1996). Instead, banks prefer to operate through subsidiaries in order to offer retail
services to local residents or to engage in activities that are not permitted to branches
(deposit-taking and lending).
Our analysis focuses on the acquisition of foreign shareholdings, which is how banks
commonly choose to expand abroad in the retail sector. In fact, although recent
developments in information technology and telecommunications make it possible to sell
banking services worldwide, personal relationships remain fundamental for most traditional
banking activities (see, for example, Rajan, 1998). For this reason, banks that wish to gain a
significant market share in a foreign country often find it more profitable to buy an equity
share in an already established bank: though a foreign bank may have a comparative
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2  Goldberg and Saunders (1981) analyze the different organizational structures available to a bank that
wants to expand its activities abroad: representative offices, agencies, branches and subsidiaries. They find that,
in practice, a bank essentially has two options: it can open a new branch or it can buy an equity share in a bank
that is already operational.10
advantage in terms of its organization of banking activity, it is very unlikely to be in a better
position than local banks with regard to building new relationships with local clients.
Historically, the pattern of bank international shareholdings followed that of the
economic integration between countries: banks extended their activities abroad in order to
provide services to their home-country clients in international transactions; afterwards, with
a growing understanding of the foreign market (in particular of regulatory and institutional
aspects) and a developed network of relationships with local financial institutions, some
banks were induced to increase the range of their operations and provide services to the local
population too.
Although this account is likely to be accurate in general, we believe that today the
actual pattern of bank international shareholdings depends on a wider range of factors than
just the overall degree of economic integration between countries. In this paper we provide
some evidence in favor of this view. Our contribution is twofold. First, we use a larger
sample of banks (nearly 2,500 banks) and countries (the 29 OECD countries) than previous
studies. This permits us to examine jointly the motivations of cross-border bank
shareholdings and the factors that lead some countries to be preferred destinations, to make
comparisons between banks with and without cross-border shareholdings for each country in
our sample, and to separate individual bank characteristics from home-country factors
determining the pattern of internationalization. Second, we consider a wider set of
explanatory variables than previous studies. We are then able to show that profit
opportunities in the destination market of the investment are a key factor in determining the
pattern of bank international shareholdings, even controlling for the degree of economic
integration and the regulatory and institutional characteristics of each country.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets a basic framework for the
empirical analysis, reviewing the explanations suggested in the literature, with regard to
banks’ decisions to expand abroad. Section 3 presents the main theoretical hypotheses for
scrutiny and the econometric methodology adopted. Section 4 describes the data from the 29
OECD countries used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents the results of the
econometric analysis on the characteristics of banks that expand cross-border and of the
countries where banks prefer to acquire shareholdings. Conclusions are set out in the final
section.11
2. Determinants of banks’ cross-border shareholdings
An enterprise can profitably extend its activities to foreign countries only if it has a
comparative advantage with respect to local competitors: otherwise, local firms would crowd
it out of the market. Cross-border expansion therefore follows a pattern that reflects the
structure of comparative advantages of the home-country enterprise.
3
Previous studies examined the patterns of international banking by analyzing the
location chosen by banks of a specific home-country or by studying foreign banks’ activities
in a specific host-country. Two major groups of factors determining banks’ decisions to
expand abroad have been found: bank-specific and location-specific.
4
2.1  Bank-specific factors
2.1.1  Size
Among bank-specific characteristics, size has been found to affect mainly the
patterns of foreign direct investment: larger banks are much more international than smaller
ones.
5 A number of different reasons can justify this result. In particular, the customers of
                                                          
3  Two main strands of theoretical literature have developed to explain such a pattern in multinational
investment: the internalization theory, which stresses that the advantages of multinational enterprises derive
from the possibility of limiting the cost of market failures by carrying out a share of their transactions within
the boundaries of the firm, and the eclectic theory, which adds ownership-specific advantages (for example,
access to the endowments of the parent company at costs below market price) and location advantages (for
example, barriers to trade or institutional arrangements) to the incentives related to internalization (see
Dunning, 1988, for a review of these theories). The standard point of view in the banking literature is the
eclectic theory (see, for example, Williams, 1997). In this paper, we simply assume that the maximization of
the stream of expected profits determines a bank’s decision to expand abroad.
4  A number of papers on multinational banking were published at the beginning of the eighties: see, for
example, Goldberg and Saunders (1980 and 1981), Houpt (1980), Tschoegel (1982), Ball and Tschoegel
(1982), Giddy (1983), Tschoegel (1983) and the survey by Aliber (1984). More recently, this topic has been
studied by Jones (1990), Goldberg and Johnson (1990), Grosse and Goldberg (1991), Goldberg and Grosse
(1994), Brealey and Kaplanis (1996), DeYoung and Nolle (1996), Mahajan, Rangan and Zardkoohi (1996),
Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Min (1998), Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1998), Yamori (1998),
Williams (1996, 1997 and 1998), Buch (1999), and Peek, Rosengren and Kasirye (1999).
5 A positive correlation between the size of banks and their degree of internationalization has been found
in a number of empirical studies. Ball and Tschoegel (1982) show that foreign banks that are more committed
to doing business in California (i.e., those having a subsidiary) are larger than those that only have a branch.
Tschoegel (1983) analyzes the world’s 100 largest international banks in 1976, defined as those with at least
one office abroad. He finds a positive correlation between the size of the bank and the degree of trans-12
larger banks are generally larger and more internationally diversified enterprises (see,
Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995). Therefore, these banks have more incentive to follow
their clients when they operate abroad. Moreover, in some countries a few large banks hold a
very large share of total credit and therefore are more exposed to credit risk; these banks
have a stronger incentive to extend their activities abroad as a way of either diversifying
their portfolio or smoothing the effects of asynchronous fluctuations of loans and deposits.
Finally, some specific activities such as portfolio management and investment banking may
be characterized by economies of scale and scope.
6
2.1.2  Efficiency
On average, banks that normally operate in developed markets are more efficient and
therefore more likely to hold a comparative advantage with respect to their competitors in
the destination market. Grosse and Goldberg (1991) confirm this hypothesis, finding a
positive correlation between the number of foreign banks in the United States from a given
country and the development of that country’s financial sector. Berger, DeYoung, Genay,
and Udell (1999) find that although domestic banks in France, Germany, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the United States are on average more cost efficient and more profit efficient
than foreign-owned banks, this is not true of foreign-owned banks from the United States.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
nationality (measured by the number of countries where it is present). Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992), studying a
sample of Japanese banks with investment in South Korea, find a positive relation between a bank’s asset size
and the number of branches. Williams (1996) finds similar results for a sample of Japanese banks with
shareholdings in Australia; Williams (1998) again finds similar results for a larger sample of foreign banks in
Australia.
6 These activities entail high start-up costs, mainly in connection with accumulating the levels of human
capital and expertise that are essential for efficient operations in the most advanced financial markets. This has
favored the development of networks of multinational banks, capable of offering highly innovative services at a
marginal cost that is almost zero. Casson (1990) argues that this is one reason why multinational banks are
generally organized hierarchically, with a hub towards which all activities of foreign subsidiaries and branches
converge.13
2.2  Location-specific factors
2.2.1  Economic integration
There is broad consensus that the pattern of bank foreign direct investment is strongly
correlated with the degree of integration between the home country of the parent company
and the country where the investment is made. This has been measured by at least three
variables: geographical distance (Ball and Tschoegel, 1982; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991); the
volume of bilateral trade flows (Goldberg and Saunders, 1980 and 1981; Goldberg and
Johnson, 1990; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamoori, 1998);
and the value of bilateral foreign direct investment (Nigh, Cho and Krishnan, 1986;
Goldberg and Johnson, 1990; Grosse and Goldberg, 1991; Sagari, 1992; Brealey and
Kaplanis, 1996; Williams, 1998; Yamori, 1998; Miller and Parkhe, 1998; Buch, 1999). All
these studies find a positive and significant correlation between the flow of bank foreign
direct investment and the measures of bilateral integration between countries.
7 The
explanation is that banks often extend their activities abroad in order to provide bank
services to their home clients who operate in a foreign country.
8
2.2.2  Regulatory restrictions
Regulatory restrictions in each country also affect the pattern of bank international
investment. A number of studies (e.g., Nigh, Cho and Krishnan, 1986; Goldberg and
Johnson, 1990; Sagari, 1992; Miller and Parkhe, 1998) find that restrictions on the entry of
                                                          
7  An exception is given by Miller and Parkhe (1998), who find a negative correlation between both the
number of foreign offices of US banks and their total foreign assets and the level of bilateral trade with the
destination country of the investment, although they find a positive relation with the volume of non-bank
foreign direct investment. Moshirian and Van der Laan (1998) find a similar correlation for the values of total
assets held abroad by Japan, UK and US banks. Miller and Parkhe (1998) attribute this result to a “suppression
effect”, related to the capability of US banks to offer trade-related financial services directly from the United
States home owing to the dollar’s role as an international currency.
8  An interesting and related finding by Yamoori (1998) is that the probability of a bank having an equity
interest abroad is positively correlated with the number of foreign banks from the same country already
operating there. This may be explained by the fact that if foreign banks from the same country of origin offer
their services abroad to customers of their parent companies’ nationality, they can eventually establish a closer
customer relationship and gain market share at home too. In order to limit the risk of losing customer fidelity,
the leading banks of a country might tend to expand abroad following the identical pattern.14
foreign investors significantly reduce the degree of internationalization of a country’s
banking market. A related result is that US banks prefer to expand in countries where capital
requirements are less stringent and taxes are lower (Miller and Parkhe, 1998).
2.2.3  Local market opportunities
No conclusive evidence has been reached on the relevance of profit opportunities in
the destination market (local market opportunities) for the location choice of multinational
banks. Several studies include a country risk proxy in the analysis (Grosse and Goldberg,
1991; Fisher and Molyneux, 1996; Yamori, 1998) and find that banks prefer to invest their
resources in countries with more stable economic conditions. Nigh, Cho, and Krishnan
(1986) examine the determinants of US banks' expansion into 30 countries, both developed
and less developed, and find that local market opportunities appear insignificant. On the
contrary, Grosse and Goldberg (1991) find that the level of foreign banking activities in each
US state is correlated with the share of employment in the financial sector in that same state.
Yamori (1998) finds that Japanese multinational banks prefer to locate in countries with
higher per capita income. Goldberg and Johnson (1990) find that the number of foreign
offices of US banks in a given country is positively correlated with per capita income, but
total assets are negatively correlated. Brealey and Kaplanis (1996) and Buch (1999) find a
positive correlation between host country GDP and the presence of foreign banks,
concluding in favor of the hypothesis that the activity of a foreign office is related to capital
market activities. However, a previous study by Sagari (1992) does not find a positive effect
of market size (measured by GDP) on the pattern of international expansion of US banks.
Finally, Miller and Parkhe (1998) suggest that banks prefer to invest in countries where the
banking sector is more developed. However, they find only partial confirmation of this
hypothesis in the data, which show that the correlation between assets held abroad by banks
and the degree of development of the financial market is positive for developed countries but
negative for developing countries.
9
                                                          
9  Giddy (1983), by contrast, argues that foreign bank presence be greater in countries where the banking
sector is protected and less competitive, as this is generally associated with higher average profits.15
3.  Empirical model
3.1  Choice of explanatory variables
Research on banking consolidation at domestic level shows that in a substantial share
of mergers and acquisitions, larger and more efficient institutions tend to take over smaller,
less efficient firms, presumably to spread their expertise and operating procedures over
additional resources (see, for example, Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999). Consolidation
may also enhance efficiency if greater diversification improves the risk-expected return
tradeoff.
Following this literature, we assume that banks that are larger, more efficient and from
countries with a more efficient banking system are more likely to expand abroad. Moreover,
we verify that, conditional on the levels of bilateral economic integration and regulatory
restrictions, they are more likely to expand to countries where local market opportunities are
greater.
As we have seen before, previous literature on international banking has considered
total and per capita GDP as proxies for local market opportunities. In our view, these
measures have two main drawbacks. First, unitary bank profits are likely to be lower in more
developed countries, where the banking sector is usually more competitive. Second, within a
group of countries whose long-run rate of economic growth is converging to a common
level, poorer nations might have higher expected rates of economic development than
wealthier ones.
For these reasons, we adopt a broader definition of local market opportunities: we
assume that banks prefer to expand to countries where the banking system is on average less
efficient and where the expected rate of economic growth is higher.16
Following Levin and Zevros (1998), we interpret that lower levels of initial output and
inflation and higher levels of stock market capitalization, banking-sector development and of
judicial-system efficiency forecast higher expected rates of economic growth.
10
The measure of banks’ efficiency is also a complicated issue and it is crucial to
correctly identify the effects of banking consolidation (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999).
In the following, we consider profitability as a proxy for efficiency. This is justified by the
fact that in the econometric analysis we control for other market characteristics that may
influence the level of the return on assets: the degree of market concentration, the banks’
average size, the availability of free cash flow, the presence of state-owned banks and the
level of non-interest income.
11 We subsequently try to identify the source of profit (again
conditional on market characteristics): the net interest margins after charge-offs, which
measures retail banking profitability, and the cost-income ratio (overheads to total income),
which is our proxy for cost efficiency.
The role of local market opportunities in determining the pattern of bank
internationalization is the central issue of our empirical analysis. However, following the
literature, we also control for the effects of two other sets of factors: the degree of economic
integration between countries (measured by the geographical distance, the level of bilateral
trade and the flow of bilateral foreign direct investment) and the presence of regulatory
restrictions, both on domestic banking activity and on bank foreign investment.
                                                          
10  Foreign banks are also likely to feel more secure about acquiring assets in countries where the judicial
system is more efficient and market transactions (including their purchase) are better guaranteed.
11 It is an empirical regularity that the most efficient banks in developed countries earn a smaller
percentage of profits from traditional activities and a larger percentage from off-balance-sheet operations (see,
for example, Generale and Gobbi, 1999). These banks have reduced the relative size of their traditional
activities, not because of lower productivity, but because of lower growth potential. In fact, these banks are also
likely to be more efficient. However, an opposite force might offset this effect: off-balance-sheet activities
normally require less frequent ‘face-to-face’ meetings with clients, are more standardized and, in general, imply
less intense personal relationships; as a result they can often be exported directly. Therefore, if banks with a
larger share of their revenues coming from off-balance-sheet operations were not interested in expanding their
traditional banking activities abroad, but only their most advanced ones, we would find a negative correlation
between the share of revenues coming from non-traditional activities and the degree of internationalization of
the bank. Whether these two forces offset each other or whether one prevails is an empirical question.17
3.2  Econometric setup
Two phases of the process of internationalization are considered. First, we analyze the
determinants of a bank’s decision to expand abroad. Second, we study the factors
determining the choice of where to expand; we limit our analysis to a sub-sample of banks
that have at least one foreign shareholding.
3.2.1 Determinants of a bank’s decision to expand abroad
A bank’s decision on whether to expand abroad is modeled as a binary choice, based
on all the available information used to forecast the expected profitability of the investment.
We look for an answer to the following question: which characteristics of a bank, and its
country of origin, make it more probable that it will hold an equity interest in a foreign bank?
Accordingly, we estimate the following binary choice model:
Pr (Yij  = 1) = f (Xi,Zj), (1)
where: Y ij equals one when the bank i of country j has a foreign subsidiary and zero
otherwise, Xi is a vector of bank-specific variables and Zj is a vector of country-specific
variables. We adopt a discrete choice model because in general it is difficult to infer the
effective degree of involvement in the operations of an invested bank from the share of
capital controlled: in some cases shareholdings of 10 per cent of capital may be sufficient to
significantly control a bank; in others, 50 per cent plus one share is necessary.
We use a probit specification to estimate equation (1). This choice is the result of the
following specification search process. We first estimated a fixed effect and a random effect
logit (where the individual effect was calculated with respect to the country of origin) on the
same covariates, in order to test for independence of the random effect from the exogenous
variables. We prefer the random effect model as it allows us to introduce country-specific
exogenous variables in the regression. The Hausman test confirmed that the hypothesis of
absence of correlation could be accepted at the 99 per cent confidence level. Then we
estimated a random effect probit, including a number of country-specific variables. The null18
hypothesis of absence of random effect in this case was accepted at the 99 per cent level,
suggesting that the presence of a significant random effect in the logit regression was due to
the absence of country-specific variables. We therefore estimate our model using a probit
specification.
3.2.2  Choice of where to expand
The second part of our empirical analysis seeks to answer the following question: what
are the characteristics of countries with a larger number of foreign banks? We model this as
a set of binary choices that each bank makes on whether or not to operate a subsidiary in any
one of the countries in our sample. In practice, we estimate
Pr (Yijh  = 1) = f (Bi,Kh), (2)
where: Yijh  equals one when the bank i of country j has a foreign subsidiary in country h and
zero otherwise; Bi  is a vector of variables describing the relationships between the home
country and the destination country and Kh is a vector of variables specific to the destination
country. This model is estimated on the sub-sample of banks that have at least one equity
interest abroad.
We use a random effect probit specification to estimate equation (2). As before, this
choice is the result of a specification search process. In order to test for the independence of
the random effect from the exogenous variables, we first estimated a random effect and a
fixed effect logit (where the individual effect was calculated with respect to each bank) on
the same covariates. We prefer the random effect model as it allows us to hypothesize a
correlation between the probabilities of a bank’s having foreign shareholdings in more than
one country. The Hausman test confirmed that the hypothesis of absence of correlation with
the covariates could be accepted at the 99 per cent confidence level. We then estimated a
random effect probit, including a number of country-specific variables. The null hypothesis
of absence of random effect was in this case rejected at the 99 per cent level.19
4. Data and summary statistics
4.1  Data on banks
All bank-specific data used in this work are taken from Bankscope, an international
data set of balance sheet items on individual banks, where all the main information on assets,
liabilities and revenues is reported according to a common, comparable standard. The
analysis is conducted on a sub-sample of 2,449 banks with total assets of more than $ 1
billion and with headquarters in one of the 29 OECD countries. Foreign subsidiaries are
included in the sample as autonomous banks, while foreign branch activity is included in that
of the controlling bank. As is common in the literature, we consider only the first level of
foreign shareholdings.
In order to minimize the effects of particular events, all data on banks’ assets,
liabilities and revenues are averages of annual values from 1994 to 1997. Information on
foreign shareholders refers to the end of 1998. Some clear outliers are identified,
12 so that
only 2,148 banks are included in the sample. Further, we also consider a sub-sample of the
260 banks with total assets of more than $ 25 billion.
The distribution of the banks in the sample by size and by country is reported in Table
1. The United States has the largest number of banks in the sample (488); Germany has 472
banks; Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan and France have between 119 and 178 each; and all
the other countries have fewer then 100. Japan has the highest number of large banks (56),
followed by the United States (42), Germany (33), the United Kingdom (22) and France
(20). Of the 2,148 banks in the sample, 146 have cross-border shareholdings (6.8 per cent of
the sample), while 276 have foreign shareholders (12.8 per cent).
Table 2 reports all the cross-border shareholdings between banks included in the
sample. There are 345 instances of shareholdings in foreign countries (on average, each of
the 146 banks has at least one cross-border shareholding in approximately 2,4 countries).
                                                          
12  In particular, 301 banks are excluded because they have either negative interest margins, negative
operating income, net return on asset lower than –1 per cent or higher than 4 per cent, or overheads higher than
total operating income.20
A first question in evaluating the degree of internationalization of each country’s
banking system is how to compare different shareholdings in banks of different size. In
principle, one would like to measure the effective power of each shareholder in determining
the bank’s activity. However, this clearly depends on the distribution of ownership, so that
an approximation such as assuming that a majority interest is needed for effective control
may be strongly biased. As already mentioned, in the econometric analysis we adopt a
discrete choice model. However, in Table 3 the degree of international openness of each
country’s banking system is measured as the average percentage held by foreign
shareholders (which is a broader definition since it also includes non-bank shareholders),
weighted by each bank’s total assets.
The country with the largest share of its banking market controlled by foreign
investors is Luxembourg (81.4 per cent, more than half of which by German investors),
thanks to its particularly favorable institutional environment. The percentage is also high in
some other small countries, such as New Zealand (56.2 per cent of the banking market
controlled by foreign investors, mainly from Australia and the UK), Ireland (30.2 per cent,
mainly from Germany) and Belgium (22.8 per cent, mainly from the Netherlands and
France). Foreign investors also control large portions of the banking markets of East
European OECD countries: 32.2 per cent in Hungary (mainly from Germany and Italy); 30.1
per cent in the Czech Republic (mainly from the United States and Japan) and 16.8 per cent
in Poland (mainly from the United States). This is partly explained by the recent
privatization of state-owned banks, which have been open to foreign investors. Italy has the
highest degree of internationalization among the G7 countries (7.6 per cent, mainly investors
from France and Germany); Japan has the lowest (0.2 per cent). Finally, the last row of
Table 3 shows the ratio of foreign-controlled bank assets to the size of the domestic banking
market. The degree of active openness is higher in smaller countries such as Belgium,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria and Switzerland (21.0, 18.0, 17.4, 12.2 and 10.2 per cent,
respectively). Among the G7 countries, Canada (6.0 per cent), Germany (6.0 per cent) and
France (5.6 per cent) have a higher degree of active internationalization, while Italy, Japan
and the United States record figures ranging between 3 and 4 per cent. No foreign
shareholdings in OECD banks are reported for investors from the three East European
OECD countries, Iceland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Korea and Turkey.21
Panel A in Table 4 reports some summary statistics for the 2,148 banks included in the
sample. Panel B reports on the sub-sample of 260 large banks (i.e., those with total assets of
more than $ 25 billion). In both samples, banks with foreign shareholdings are on average
much larger than other banks and have a higher share of revenues from non-traditional
activities. The returns on equity are similar, but the return on assets is lower for larger banks,
owing to smaller net interest margins and cash flows.
4.2  Data on countries
Data on GDP, population, bank credit and inflation are from IMF, International
Financial Statistics (1998). Bilateral trade and foreign direct investment data are respectively
from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (1998) and OECD, International Direct Investment
Statistics Yearbook (1998). Stock market capitalization is from IFC, Emerging Stock
Markets Factbook (1998). Data on the “efficiency of the judicial system” are taken from La
Porta et al. (1998). Data on the level of regulatory restrictions on domestic banking activity
and on the relevance of state-owned banks are taken from Barth et al. (2000). Finally, the
indices on the level of restrictions on inward and outward shareholdings in the banking
sector have been built from IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(1997). All the variables considered have a high degree of cross-country variability (Table
5).
5. Econometric results
5.1  Determinants of a bank’s decision to expand abroad
5.1.1  Results from basic regressions
Table 6 reports the estimates of three specifications of equation (1). Of the 2,148
observations originally used in the regressions, 56 are lost in the estimation presented in
Panel A, because we do not have data on total credit, stock market capitalization and exports
for Luxembourg. In Panel B, an additional 33 observations relative to the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland are also excluded, because we do not have information on the22
regulatory restrictions on banking activity in these countries. Panel C considers the sub-
sample of 257 banks with more than $ 25 billion of total assets (excluding 3 large banks
from Luxembourg). In all three specifications, both bank-specific and home-country-specific
characteristics are included as explanatory variables.
13
In the first regression (Panel A) the coefficients of five country-specific variables are
significantly different from zero. As expected, the degree of trade openness (measured by the
ratio of exports to GDP) is positively correlated with the probability that a bank has an
equity interest abroad, consistent with the hypothesis that one of the main determinants of
banking internationalization is the incentive for banks to “follow their clients” when they
operate in foreign markets. The size of the banking sector (measured by the ratio of total
credit to the economy to GDP) and the average country level of return on assets in the
banking sector are also positively correlated with the degree of bank internationalization.
These results confirm that banks originating in countries with a more profitable and
developed banking sector are more likely to have a comparative advantage with respect to
their competitors in the destination market. More surprisingly, we find that the size of the
stock market (measured by the value of stock market capitalization over GDP) is negatively
correlated with banks’ internationalization. We interpret this result as evidence that the
choice to expand abroad is driven by the banks’ search for profit opportunities beyond those
offered by traditional banking activity in their home market: when the financial sector is
sufficiently developed so that additional profit opportunities are exploitable in the home
country simply by offering more innovative financial services, there is less incentive to
expand abroad. Finally, we find that banks from countries with a higher average rate of
inflation are less internationalized: a higher rate of inflation weakens the exchange rate and
therefore makes foreign acquisitions more expensive.
Three coefficients of bank-specific variables are significant in the regression reported
in Panel A. The return on assets is positively correlated with the probability that the bank has
an equity interest abroad; this result is consistent with the hypothesis that efficiency, here
                                                          
13  Banks in the sample are categorized as commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks,
medium and long-term banks, real estate-mortgage banks, savings banks, specialized government credit
institutions, and investment banks and securities houses. Although not reported in the tables, dummies for each
category of banks are included in all the regressions.23
proxied by profitability, positively affects the level of internationalization. Banks with a
larger share of non-interest income are also more likely to have foreign equity interests.
Apparently, this result is in contrast with the hypothesis that banks which are able to shift
their activity toward innovative financial services in their home market have a less incentive
to expand abroad. However, conditional on the opportunities of diversification offered by the
home market (measured by the size of the stock market) it is not surprising to find that more
innovative banks look for new profit opportunities and, therefore, have both a larger share of
revenues from non traditional activities and a higher propensity to expand abroad.
Finally, consistent with previous literature, our results show that the size of the bank
(measured by the logarithm of its total assets) is positively correlated with its degree of
internationalization. As discussed above, at least three reasons contribute to this result. First,
multinational enterprises are more likely to be customers of larger banks and, therefore, it is
more probable that these banks will decide to offer some of their services abroad. Second,
banks with a large home-market share are more likely to have a strong incentive to search for
risk diversification and new profit opportunities abroad. Third, increasing returns to scale in
some of the banking activities that characterize international banking, such as portfolio
management and investment banking, may favor larger banks.
In our view, the variables included in the regression reported in Panel A offer a very
plausible characterization of the pattern of bank internationalization. The explanatory power
is also fairly good: the pseudo R
2 is 0.56.
In theory, this specification might be problematic since it assumes that balance sheet
data affects the decisions of banks to expand abroad; some of the variables may instead
depend on the fact that a bank has a foreign shareholding (i.e., there may be problems of
reverse causality: in particular, banks may be larger owing to their degree of
internationalization). However, in an unreported regression with individual banks’ fixed
effect we have checked for this possibility; we found a negative and insignificant effect of
foreign shareholdings on the rate of growth of total assets between 1994 and 1997.
Table 6 also reports the magnitude of the effect of each explanatory variable,
measured as the change in the probability that a bank has a foreign shareholding (expressed
in percentage points) associated with a change in the covariate from the 25
th to the 75
th24
percentile of the sample distribution, leaving all other variables at their sample values; we
refer to this as the marginal effect. The results show that the measures of bank profitability
and efficiency most affect the probability that a bank has a foreign shareholding. The
marginal effects of changes in the average country level of return on assets and in the size of
the banking sector are particularly strong (respectively 7.00 and 5.31 percentage points). The
impact of the measure of trade openness is weaker (1.53). Among individual bank
characteristics, the most relevant is size (4.71); return on assets and non-interest income have
weaker effects (1.98 and 1.12, respectively). These results confirm our claim that the overall
degree of economic integration between countries is only one, and probably the least
important, of the determinants in explaining the pattern of bank international shareholdings.
Panel B reports the estimates of a specification that includes two variables describing
the regulatory restrictions on domestic banking activity and on banks’ outward foreign direct
investment. The coefficients of both variables are significant and with the expected sign.
Restrictions on outward foreign direct investment obviously reduce the propensity of banks
to acquire foreign equity interests. More interestingly, we find that banks in more regulated
markets are less likely to hold foreign equity interests. We interpret this as evidence that the
restrictions reduce the efficiency of the banking sector. As a result, banks from these
countries are less likely to have a comparative advantage with respect to their competitors in
the destination market.
Including the variables on regulatory restrictions results in only two changes with
respect to the first regression: the coefficient on inflation becomes insignificant and that on
average country level bank non-interest income becomes significant at the 10 per cent level.
However, the change in the inflation coefficient is due to the elimination of the observations
from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (where there has been high inflation) and not
to the inclusion of the measures of regulatory restrictions.
The result concerning the average level of bank non-interest income might depend on
the fact that when no measure of regulatory restrictions is included, this variable may capture
two opposite effects. In fact, higher non-interest income implies: a) that banks can search for
new profit opportunities within their home country; b) that there are fewer institutional
restrictions and a higher degree of internationalization. Only the first effect, which reduces
the probability that banks have international shareholdings, remains after including a direct25
measure of regulatory restrictions. Aside from these changes, the results reported in Panel B
are substantially identical to those of Panel A, including the magnitude of the marginal
effects.
Panel C presents the results of a regression on the sub-sample of 257 banks with total
assets of more than $ 25 billion. The decision to analyze this sub-sample is suggested by the
large impact of bank size in the first two regressions. Surprisingly, narrowing the sample to
larger banks does not reduce the level of significance of the coefficient on size; on the
contrary, it does increase the magnitude of its marginal effect relative to the other
explanatory variables. This result seems to suggest that the hypothesis that banks must reach
a minimum scale to find it profitable to expand their activities abroad is probably not true,
while the idea that there are increasing returns to scale from internationalization is more
plausible.
There are other differences between the results of Panel C and those of the first two
regressions. The coefficient of the degree of openness of the origin country becomes
insignificant when we consider only larger banks. This may be explained by the fact that
larger banks have the same incentive to follow their clients abroad, since all of them have
international firms among their clients. However, this assumption is too strong, given the
large number of banks from different countries included in our sample. Therefore we are
inclined to interpret this result as evidence that the “follow the clients” determinant for
internationalization is only relevant for small banks, while the behavior of larger banks is
determined by more complex diversification policies. The coefficient of the measure of the
restrictions on domestic banking activity is insignificant, possibly because the smaller
sample includes only fairly competitive markets and because larger banks more easily find
ways to sidestep regulations. The coefficient of the average country bank non-interest
income is also insignificant, although it remains negative as in the first two regressions.
Finally, perhaps surprisingly, the coefficient of individual bank return on assets is
negative and largely insignificant, while it was positive and highly significant in the first two
regressions. Probably, this depends on the reduced variability of return on assets within the
same country when only larger banks are considered. In fact, in an unreported regression we
find that including only return on assets at the individual level the coefficient is positive and
significant at the 13 per cent level.26
The pseudo R
2 of the regression in Panel C is 0.40, lower than in the previous two
specifications but still reasonably high.
Table 7 shows the results of three regressions similar to those reported in Table 6,
where return on assets is split into its two major components: net interest margins less
charge-offs over total assets (a measure of profitability of traditional activities) and the cost-
income ratio. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that banks with higher returns
from traditional activity and lower costs are more internationalized, but the estimates of the
cost-income coefficients are not precise.
In Panel A, the coefficients have the expected sign, positive for interest margins and
negative for costs (although only the average country level of costs is significant). The
coefficients of the other variables are essentially unchanged with respect to the
correspondent specification in Table 6, with the exception of that on average country bank
non-interest income, which is now positive and significant. This upward bias can be
explained by the presence of banks that have a high return on assets because of their income
from off-balance-sheet operations; this effect is in fact accounted for in the specification in
Table 6 but not here. Panel B reports the results obtained including the measure of regulatory
restrictions: in this case the cost-income variables are not significant, although they still have
the expected sign. Finally, Panel C reports the results of estimates on the sample of larger
banks. The findings in this case are less neat. On the revenues side, only the coefficient of
the average country level of interest margins is significant, probably due to its low variability
on individual observations within each country when only large banks are considered. On the
cost side, the coefficient of the average country level is negative and significant, as expected,
but surprisingly that of individual bank overheads is positive and significant. This last result
might be consistent with the anecdotal evidence that in countries with the most efficient
banking systems, more innovative banks have high levels of investment in technology and
human capital and, therefore, their costs are above average.
5.1.2  Robustness checks
In order to verify the robustness of our preferred specification (Table 6, Panel B), we
test for the significance of other explanatory variables that are consistent with explanations27
of the patterns of international shareholdings suggested in the literature. The results, reported
in Table 8, show that none of the additional covariates is significant at least at the 10 per cent
level and that their inclusion does not affect the coefficients of the variables included in the
basic specification.
The average country level of banks’ total assets verifies the hypothesis that banking
systems with fewer and larger banks are more likely to expand abroad than more fragmented
systems. The coefficient of this variable is positive but insignificant, showing that size
matters only at individual level. The degree of market concentration, measured by the
Herfindahl index, controls for the effects of lower competition on the level of return on
assets and verifies if higher concentration leads to a greater need for cross-border
diversification. The coefficient is negative (consistent with the hypothesis that higher
concentration is associated with lower efficiency) but not significantly different from zero.
Similarly, the hypothesis that banking systems largely controlled by the government are
relatively less efficient is checked including the share of assets controlled by state-owned
banks. As before, the coefficient has the expected sign but is not significant. The average
country level and the individual level of bank cash flow can be interpreted as a measure of
bank efficiency (if the cash flow is too high, resources could be used more profitably) but
also of the availability of liquid assets for acquisitions abroad. The coefficients of these
variables are not significant, perhaps because the two opposing effects offset each other. The
level of per capita GDP verifies the hypothesis that more developed countries, with generally
more efficient banking and financial markets, are more likely to host international banks.
The negative and insignificant coefficient shows that the other variables included in the basic
regression already measure the effects of the average efficiency of the banking system. The
size of the population verifies the possibility that there is a correlation between country-size
and the degree of internationalization of the banking system (e.g., because smaller countries
have more open economies). However, the estimated coefficient is insignificant, possibly
because this effect is already captured by the degree of trade openness. Countries with more
efficient judicial systems might have a less developed banking system, because they have
more efficient markets. As a result, local banks may have a lower degree of
internationalization. The coefficient of this variable is however insignificant, although it is
negative as expected. Finally, the average turnover in the stock market has been included as28
an alternative measure of the efficiency of the non-banking financial sector.
14 Its coefficient,
however, is insignificant.
5.2  Choice of where to expand abroad
5.2.1  Results from basic regressions
Equation (2) is estimated using a random effect probit model, where the dependent
variable equals one if a bank of country j has a foreign subsidiary in country i ≠ j and zero
otherwise. We restrict our analysis to the 143 banks that have at least one shareholding
abroad and, again, we exclude Luxembourg from our sample. Multiplying the number of
banks by the number of countries we obtain 3,861 pairs of bank-country observations, which
are used in the estimates reported in Table 9, Panel A. The regression reported in Panel B is
based on a sample that excludes 572 of the original bank-country observations due to the
lack of information on the regulatory restrictions on banking activity and on the “efficiency
of the judicial system” for Iceland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. All the
variables included in these regressions are destination-country-specific characteristics.
Our preferred specification is reported in column 4 of Panel B. The results of
previous regressions are likely to be biased because of the absence of information on the
institutional environment of the destination country and, in fact, this is clearly shown by the
change in the coefficients of many variables from column 2 to columns 3-4 of Panel B.
The loss of significance in the coefficient of return on assets from Panel A to the first
column of Panel B is clearly due to the exclusion of the Czech Republic, Hungary Iceland,
and Poland. However, comparing the results in columns 2 and 3 it is clear that including the
measure of regulatory restrictions on banking activities and the market share of state-owned
banks has a sizeable effect on the estimates. The most striking result is that once we control
for the institutional environment, the coefficient of the size of the banking sector is no longer
significant, clearly owing to the high explanatory power of other variables in the regression
                                                          
14  In fact, the value of stock market capitalization is more comparable with the level of development of the
banking sector since they are both stock measures.29
for the ratio of credit to GDP. After controlling for the effects of institutional restrictions, we
also find that banks prefer to invest in countries where the stock market is more developed,
possibly because they offer greater profit opportunities.
15
In our preferred specification (column 4, Panel B), the coefficient of bilateral trade is
positive and significant, thus confirming the hypothesis that the pattern of bank international
shareholdings depends on the overall degree of economic integration between countries. The
coefficient of the time-zone distance is also positive and significant, confirming that banks
prefer to acquire equity interests in countries where the financial markets are open when
their home offices are closed.
We also find strong evidence of the importance of local market opportunities.
According to our assumptions, these are greater in countries where the expected rate of
economic growth is higher and the banking system is on average less efficient.
The coefficients of the levels of per capita GDP and of inflation are both negative,
while that of the stock market capitalization is positive. Following Levine and Zevros
(1998), we interpret these results as confirming the hypothesis that banks prefer to invest in
countries with higher expected rates of economic growth. Turning to the variables which
describe the characteristics of the banking sector, we find that banks in countries with a
larger number of foreign investors on average have higher costs, lower net interest margins
less charge-offs, higher cash flows (signaling an inefficient use of equity capital) and higher
shares of non-interest income. The evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that
foreign investors plan to utilize their know-how and human resources in order to restructure
inefficient banks. Moreover, we find that foreigners are more likely to invest in countries
where banks are smaller, probably because it is easier to acquire such banks and there is
more opportunity to increase market share after the restructuring.
An important set of variables in this specification describes the institutional
environment of the destination country. We find that banks prefer to acquire equity interests
in countries where there are fewer regulatory restrictions on banking activity and where the
                                                          
15  Once again, the control is essential,  because profit opportunities would be substantially reduced if
banks were not allowed to operate in non-banking financial markets.30
judicial system is more efficient, although the latter coefficient is only marginally
significant. These results are not obvious; some authors have suggested that banks prefer to
invest in more regulated and protected markets, where average profits are likely to be higher
than average. A possible explanation for the negative coefficient of the restrictions on
domestic banking activity is that a heavily regulated system is less accessible to foreign
banks, even if explicit legislative limitations are not present. Moreover, the positive
coefficient of the efficiency of the judicial system suggests that foreign investors prefer to
invest in countries where market transactions (including their own investment) are more
guaranteed since, even when they enter the foreign country by acquiring a local bank, they
have a disadvantage with respect to domestic competitors in establishing the personal
relationships that are necessary to circumvent market imperfections. The market share of
state-owned banks has a positive and significant coefficient, probably because such banks
are on average less efficient. Moreover, in a number of countries in our sample bank
privatizations have offered many investment opportunities to foreigners. Finally, the positive
coefficient of the dummy variable for countries that eventually joined the European
Monetary Union shows that the prospect of a common monetary market and the absence of
exchange rate risk resulted in an increase in the number of cross border bank shareholdings.
As before, Table 9 also reports the magnitude of the marginal effect of each
explanatory variable. The results clearly show that the variables that we referred to as
measures of local market opportunities, in particular those related to bank inefficiency, have
the most impact on the probability that a bank has a foreign shareholdings in a given
country. Increasing average country net interest margins and decreasing of costs have
negative marginal effects of 8.64 and 7.71 percentage points, respectively. Non-interest
income has a negative effect of (10.99) as does average total assets (9.77). Per capita GDP
has the greatest impact: 13.38 percentage points. As claimed before, the level of bilateral
trade has a smaller effect (7.28). This evidence confirms our view that local market
opportunities have a major role in explaining the pattern of international bank investment.
5.2.2  Robustness checks
In order to verify the robustness of our preferred specification (Table 9, Panel A,
column 4), we test for the significance of other explanatory variables. As before, the results31
reported in Table 10 show that none of the additional covariates is significant, at least at the
10 per cent level, and their inclusion does not affect the value of the parameters of the
variables included in the basic specification.
We consider six additional variables, either alternative measures of variables
included in our preferred specification or characteristics which are consistent with other
explanations of the patterns of international shareholdings suggested in the literature. The
concentration of the banking market does not affect the pattern of bank international
shareholding, as shown by the largely insignificant coefficients of the Herfindhal index,
since the effects related to the level of competition are already captured by other variables.
The population size of the country, which some authors have suggested could be
indicative of development opportunities, also has a negative and insignificant coefficient.
Perhaps surprisingly, the restrictions on foreign investment in the banking sector do not
significantly affect the pattern of international bank shareholding. A possible interpretation
for this result is that some countries might not have explicit legal restrictions on foreign
entry, but there are implicit restrictions that are better proxied by the restrictions on domestic
banking activity.
Stock market liquidity (an alternative measure of the development of non-bank
financial markets) and the geographical distance between countries both have coefficients
that are not significantly different from zero. The inclusion of the latter reduces the size of
the coefficient on the dummy variable for countries that eventually joined the European
Monetary Union (which in fact are very closed), though it remains significant at the 10 per
cent level. Finally, the coefficient of the ratio of bilateral foreign direct investment to GDP is
positive and significant, and its inclusion does not affect the significance of the coefficient of
bilateral exports, although it reduces its size.
16
                                                          
16  The inclusion of this variable results in a loss of 476 more observations.32
6. Conclusions
The entry of foreign banks in the domestic market has traditionally been a matter of
concern for policymakers. On one side it is believed that supervision of foreign banks is far
more complicated than supervision of domestic banks (mainly because it is often very
difficult to evaluate the degree of risk of the parent bank; see, Dale, 1984) and that foreign
institutions are also less receptive to “moral suasion” on the part of the local authorities. On
the other side, foreign banks are often accused of enhancing the financial fragility of the
country where they operate, by failing to continue in operation when a worsening of the
economic environment squeezes their profitability or increases their risk.
17.
The estimation of the model studying the determinants of a bank’s decision to expand
abroad shows the importance of the factors associated with the efficiency of the single bank
and of the overall banking market in the origin country. Banks operating in countries where
the banking sector is larger and more profitable, after controlling for market characteristics,
should be able to export a superior skill and are therefore more likely to expand their
activities abroad. With reference to the sample that includes only the largest banks, we also
find evidence that cost-efficiency plays an important role. More surprisingly, we find that the
size of the stock market (measured by the value of stock market capitalization over GDP) is
negatively correlated with banks’ internationalization. We interpret this result as evidence
that banks of countries where the non-banking financial sector is smaller have poorer
prospects of growth at home (as the non-banking financial sector will eventually expand at
the expense of the banking sector) and lower profit opportunities. However, it appears that
banks with a larger share of non-interest income are more likely to have foreign
shareholdings, perhaps because they have more innovative and aggressive strategies in both
home and foreign markets. Finally, restrictions on outward foreign direct investment and to
domestic banking activity reduce the propensity of banks to acquire foreign equity interests.
The size of the bank is a key determinant of the decision to expand abroad. Larger
banks are more likely to have foreign shareholdings, and this remains true even considering
                                                          
17 Moreover, it is believed that they are excessively sensitive to economic conditions in the home country
of the parent company. Peek and Rosengren (1997) actually found that lending by Japanese banks in the U.S.
declined as a result of the stock market crash in Japan.33
a sub-sample of banks with more than $ 25 billion of total assets. This result is coherent with
the view that larger banks have stronger incentives to search for additional profit
opportunities abroad.
The importance of the degree of openness of the country for the choice of a bank to
expand abroad is confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient on the share of export
over GDP, but the marginal effect of this variable is quite small, suggesting that the need to
follow home-country clients operating abroad is not the major factor affecting bank choices.
Further, when only large banks are considered, the significance of this variable disappears.
The results of the estimation of the model studying banks’ choice of where to expand
abroad show that local market opportunities are the main determinant of the decision. We
use a broad definition of local market opportunities which combines higher expected rate of
economic growth and the banks’ inefficiency in the destination country. We are able to test
this definition since we use a larger sample of banks and countries (the 29 OECD countries)
than previous studies, which generally examined the pattern of international banking by
analyzing the location chosen by banks of a specific home-country or by studying foreign
banks’ activities in a specific host-country.
The positive correlation between the presence of foreign banks and high costs, low
returns and a less efficient use of equity capital makes plausible the view that foreign
investors plan to gain profits with a deep restructuring of inefficient banks. The importance
of lower per capita GDP, lower inflation, and higher financial deepening assign a decisive
role to the expected growth of the destination country.
The level of bilateral trade between the home-country and the destination country also
has a highly significant effect on the probability that a bank will have a foreign subsidiary.
The size of the marginal effect is also substantial, but lower than that of the variables
associated with expected profitability.
Finally, we find that banks prefer to acquire equity interests in countries where either
regulatory restrictions on banking activities are lower, possibly because these restrictions are
a proxy of actual, sometimes implicit, limitations to the entry from abroad, or the efficiency
of the judicial system is higher, thus suggesting that foreign investors prefer countries where
market transactions (including their own investment) are more guaranteed.34
Although our analysis is static, and therefore we are not able to verify if the banking
system of the destination country benefits from the entry of foreign banks, our results seem
to mitigate the negative view on the entry of foreign banks. In fact, on one side we provide
evidence showing that foreign banks are likely to be among the most efficient in their
country of origin and to come from the most developed banking markets. On the other side,
we show that bank foreign investment is generally towards markets where the banking sector
is less efficient. Foreign banking might therefore have a positive effect on the average
efficiency of the banking sector in the country of destination.Table 1
Bank’s Distribution by Size and Country
Source: Bankscope. Panel A includes the 2,148 banks in the regression sample. From the 2,449 banks with headquarters in an OECD
country and total assets of more than $ 1 billion at December 1997 are excluded 301 banks with either negative net interest margins,
or negative non-interest income, or net return on asset lower than –1.0 per cent or higher than 4.0 per cent, or overheads higher than





















Australia 4 23 1 0 430
Austria 4 158 332
Belgium 2 787 651
Canada 2 349 740
South Korea 3 60 1 0 902
Denmark 1 422 421
Finland 701 300
France 178 15 11 20 12 1
Germany 472 32 19 33 26 3
Japan 159 14 6 56 14 5
Greece 1 211 110
Ireland 2 329 220
Iceland 200 000
Italy 138 10 13 15 7 5
Luxembourg 5 63 4 6 302
Mexico 1 201 300
Norway 2 11 1 0 101
New Zealand 906 000
Netherlands 3 148 530
Poland 1 60 1 0 000
Portugal 2 638 321
United Kingdom 119 11 29 22 8 2
Czech Republic 1 006 000
Spain 9 45 1 2 843
United States 488 18 18 42 14 1
Sweden 1 421 520
Switzerland 6 23 1 1 520
Turkey 900 000
Hungary 704 000























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel A refers to the 2,148 banks included in the regression sample. In particular, from the 2,449 banks with
headquarters in an OECD country and assets of more than $ 1 billion at December 1997 are excluded 301 banks
with negative net interest margins or negative non-interest income or with net return on asset lower than –1.0 per
cent or higher than 4.0 per cent or with overheads higher than total operating income; Panel B refers to all the
banks of the sample with assets of more than $ 25 billion. Total assets are expressed in billions of US dollars.
ROE is defined as income after tax in proportion to equity. ROA (defined as income after tax), net interest mar-
gin, cash-flow (defined as equity minus fixed assets and loan loss reserves), off-balance operations, and net
charge-offs are expressed as percentages ratios of total assets. Non-interest income is expressed as a percentage
ratio of the sum of net interest margin and non-interest income. All data are calculated as the average value of
1994-1997 figures.
Variables Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: All Banks
Total Assets 2148 3.29 17.15 51.50 0.57 715.45
Net ROE 2148 7.84 8.87 8.19 -34.01 122.06
Net ROA 2148 0.39 0.58 0.61 -0.87 3.90
Net Interest Margin 2147 2.56 2.55 1.46 0.02 14.51
Non-Interest Income 2148 22.11 26.30 17.98 0.00 100.00
Overheads 2148 63.38 62.31 14.93 0.00 100.00
Cash Flow 2148 3.87 4.69 4.74 -10.23 88.13
Off-Balance 1911 9.30 23.45 73.71 0.00 1131.28
Net Charge-offs 2148 0.27 0.37 0.56 -1.87 7.03
Banks with no shareholding abroad
Total Assets 2002 2.99 9.13 23.20 0.57 432.00
Net ROE 2002 7.82 8.86 8.20 -34.01 122.06
Net ROA 2002 0.39 0.59 0.61 -0.87 3.90
Net Interest Margin 2001 2.64 2.60 1.46 0.02 14.51
Non-Interest Income 2002 20.97 25.44 17.62 0.00 100.00
Overheads 2002 63.18 62.19 14.98 0.00 100.00
Cash Flow 2002 4.01 4.74 4.66 -10.23 88.13
Off-Balance 1776 8.82 22.58 72.99 0.00 1131.28
Net Charge-offs 2002 0.27 0.37 0.57 -1.87 7.03
Banks with shareholding abroad
Total Assets 146 77.58 127.16 137.04 1.17 715.45
Net ROE 146 8.47 9.03 8.08 -15.19 34.19
Net ROA 146 0.36 0.49 0.60 -0.85 3.72
Net Interest Margin 146 1.50 1.78 1.14 0.13 8.12
Non-Interest Income 146 34.43 38.00 18.86 4.12 91.84
Overheads 146 65.27 64.03 14.26 18.68 98.61
Cash Flow 146 2.83 4.02 5.79 -0.68 64.81
Off-Balance 135 19.32 34.99 81.99 0.75 873.94
Net Charge-offs 146 0.22 0.31 0.42 -0.94 2.84Table 4 (continued)
Variables Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev Min. Max.
Panel B: Banks with total assets of more than $25 billion
Total Assets 260 57.93 105.93 113.12 25.08 715.45
Net ROE 260 7.61 7.57 8.40 -20.95 31.92
Net ROA 260 0.28 0.41 0.50 -0.85 2.27
Net Interest Margin 259 1.63 1.75 1.02 0.09 5.07
Non-Interest Income 260 32.08 33.71 20.98 0.47 100.00
Overheads 260 65.11 63.55 15.20 14.91 98.61
Cash Flow 260 2.74 3.36 2.95 -1.21 31.10
Off-Balance 218 13.22 22.56 28.85 0.00 257.69
Net Charge-offs 260 0.22 0.31 0.37 -0.94 2.15
Banks with no shareholding abroad
Total Assets 146 42.89 64.15 61.79 25.08 432.00
Net ROE 146 6.81 7.16 8.67 -20.95 31.92
Net ROA 146 0.27 0.43 0.52 -0.66 2.27
Net Interest Margin 145 1.75 1.86 1.12 0.09 5.07
Non-Interest Income 146 28.75 30.22 21.66 0.47 100.00
Overheads 146 64.05 62.07 16.36 14.91 95.33
Cash Flow 146 3.04 3.50 3.39 -1.21 31.10
Off-Balance 113 6.80 18.04 23.65 0.00 112.11
Net Charge-offs 146 0.21 0.33 0.41 -0.42 2.15
Banks with shareholding abroad
Total Assets 114 110.91 159.44 138.88 28.25 715.45
Net ROE 114 8.01 8.08 8.04 -15.19 29.73
Net ROA 114 0.30 0.38 0.46 -0.85 1.77
Net Interest Margin 114 1.45 1.62 0.86 0.13 3.92
Non-Interest Income 114 35.26 38.18 19.26 4.12 91.84
Overheads 114 65.95 65.46 13.40 26.64 98.61
Cash Flow 114 2.68 3.18 2.25 -0.68 14.09
Off Balance 105 19.38 27.43 32.99 0.75 257.69












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Determinants of a Bank’s Decision to Expand Abroad
The empirical model in equation (1) has been estimated using a probit specification, where the dependent variable equals one if the
bank has a foreign subsidiary and zero otherwise. ROA is defined as income after tax as a percentage of total assets. Non-interest in-
come is expressed as a percentage of the sum of net interest margin and non-interest income. Total assets are expressed in billions of
dollars. Data on GDP, inflation, and bank domestic credit are from IMF, International Financial Statistics (1998). Stock market
capitalization is from IFC, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1998). Exports are from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (1998).
All data are calculated as the average value of 1994-1997 figures. “Restrictions on Banking”  is taken from Barth et al. (2000);
“Restrictions on Outward Foreign Direct Investment” is our computation based on IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Re-
strictions (1997). The regression also includes dummy variables (unreported)  to account for the nature of the main activity of the
bank (commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks, medium and long  term banks, real estate-mortgage banks, savings
banks, specialized government credit institutions, and investment banks and securities houses). Standard errors are reported in italics.
The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. Mar-
ginal effect is the change in the average of the individual predicted probability (expressed in percentage points) due to an increase
from the 25
th percentile to the 75
th percentile of the variable of interest.
VARIABLES
 Panel A:
All Banks except those from
Luxembourg
Panel B:




Banks with Total Assets of



















2.151 *** 1.53 1.801 *** 1.26 0.498 1.45
Exports / GDP
0.582 0.602 1.116
1.536 *** 5.31 1.419 *** 4.69 1.651 ** 21.41
Bank Credit / GDP
0.338 0.416 0.755
-1.579 *** -3.76 -1.374 *** -3.35 -2.136 *** -24.10 Stock Market Capitali-
zation / GDP 0.348 0.330 0.523
-0.141 *** -0.64 -0.006 -0.02
Inflation
0.041 0.013
-0.323 ** -1.75 -0.273 -6.73 Restrictions on bank-
ing 0.153 0.187
-0.851 ** 0.00 -1.160 ** 0.00 Restrictions on out-
ward FDI 0.343 0.456
1.421 *** 7.00 1.349 *** 6.54 2.540 *** 29.08 Return on Assets
(Country) 0.387 0.427 0.836
-0.001 -0.06 -0.020 * -1.61 -0.026 -11.08  Non-Interest
Income (Country) 0.010 0.012 0.018
0.489 *** 1.98 0.486 *** 1.90 -0.196 -2.87 Return on Assets
(Individual) 0.164 0.167 0.326
0.010 ** 1.12 0.011 *** 1.18 0.021 *** 10.64 Non-Interest Income
(Individual) 0.004 0.004 0.008
0.881 *** 4.71 0.897 *** 5.28 0.962 *** 31.89 Total Assets
(log value) 0.068 0.066 0.143
No. Of Observations 2,092 2,059 257
Pseudo R-Square 0.56 0.58 0.40
Observed Prob. 6.84 6.95 44.36Table 7
The Determinants of a Bank’s Decision to Expand Abroad
The empirical model in equation (1) has been estimated using a probit specification, where the dependent variable equals one if the
bank has a foreign subsidiary and zero otherwise. Net interest margin (NIR) minus net charge-offs is expressed as a percentage of
total assets. Non-interest income and overheads are expressed as a percentage of the sum of net interest margin and non-interest in-
come. Total assets are expressed in billions of dollars. Data on GDP, inflation, and bank domestic credit are from IMF, International
Financial Statistics (1998). Stock market capitalization is from IFC, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1998). Exports are from
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (1998). All data are calculated as the average value of 1994-1997 figures. “Restrictions on Bank-
ing” and “State-Owned Banks’ are taken from Barth et al. (2000); “Restrictions on Outward Foreign Direct Investment” is our com-
putation on IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (1997). The regression also includes dummy variables
(unreported) to account for the nature of the main activity of the bank (commercial banks, cooperative banks, investment banks, me-
dium and long  term banks, real estate-mortgage banks, savings banks, specialized government credit institutions, and investment
banks and securities houses). Standard errors are reported in italics. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or
less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. Marginal effect is the change in the average of the individual pre-
dicted probability (expressed in percentage points) due to an increase from the 25
th percentile to the 75












Banks with Total Assets of



















2.643 *** 1.83 2.621 *** 1.83 1.468 4.26
Exports / GDP
0.686 0.696 1.024
1.568 *** 5.41 1.138 *** 3.81 1.873 ** 23.63
Bank credit / GDP
0.345 0.427 0.745
-1.261 *** -3.10 -0.846 ** -2.25 -2.325 *** -24.64 Stock Market Capitali-
zation / GDP 0.314 0.367 0.518
-0.164 *** -0.76 -0.030 -0.13
Inflation
0.054 0.042
-0.299 -1.76 -0.155 -3.55 Restrictions on bank-
ing 0.191 0.196
-0.561 * 0.00 -0.800 * 0.00 Restrictions on out-
ward FDI 0.297 0.419
-0.054 *** -2.28 -0.023 -0.98 -0.093 *** -15.67 Overheads
(Country) 0.020 0.023 0.030
0.671 *** 4.60 0.524 *** 3.45 1.024 *** 24.84 NIR -  Net Charge-Offs
(Country) 0.166 0.178 0.363
0.032 ** 2.45 0.001 0.10 0.033 13.08 Non-Interest Income
(Country) 0.014 0.019 0.022
-0.008 -0.78 -0.008 -0.76 0.021 ** 7.45 Overheads
(Individual) 0.006 0.006 0.010
0.172 * 1.83 0.185 ** 1.96 0.006 0.19 NIR -  Net Charge-Offs
(Individual) 0.096 0.093 0.143
0.019 *** 1.98 0.020 *** 2.08 0.017 * 8.30 Non-Interest Income
(Individual) 0.005 0.005 0.009
0.873 *** 5.01 0.872 *** 5.31 0.996 *** 32.49 Total Assets
(log value) 0.066 0.065 0.166
No. Of Observations 2,092 2,058 256
Pseudo R-Square .566 .570 .413





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Choice of the Where to Expand Abroad
The empirical model in equation (2) has been estimated using a random effect probit specification, where the dependent variable
equals one if a bank of country j has a foreign subsidiary in country i ≠ j and zero otherwise, and the random effect has been calcu-
lated with respect to the investing bank. We have restricted our analysis to the 143 banks that have at least one shareholding abroad.
Multiplying the number of banks in our sample by the number of OECD countries, except Luxembourg, we have obtained pairs of
bank-country observations, which constitute our regression sample in panel A. Panel B is obtained by further excluding Iceland,
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, for which some data are not available (see Table 5). ROA is defined as income after tax as
percentage of total assets. Net interest margin (NIR) minus net charge-offs and cash flow (defined as equity minus fixed assets and
loan loss reserves) are expressed as percentages of total assets. Overheads and non-interest income are expressed as percentages of
the sum of net interest margin and non-interest income. Total assets are expressed in billions of dollars. Data on inflation, GDP,
population and bank domestic credit are from IMF, International Financial Statistics (1998). Stock market capitalization is from
IFC, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook (1998). Exports are from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (1998). Bilateral exports are ex-
pressed as percentage ratio of destination country’s GDP. All data are calculated as the average value of 1994-1997 figures.
“Efficiency of judicial system” is taken from La Porta et al. (1998); “Restrictions on Banking” and “State-Owned Banks’ are taken
from Barth et al. (2000). Standard errors are reported in italics. The symbol *** indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; **
between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent. Marginal effects are the changes in the sample average of the individual pre-
dicted probability (expressed in percentage points) due to an increase from the 25
th percentile to the 75






All Countries except Luxembourg, Iceland,










































0.277 *** 6.47 0.286 *** 6.36 0.290 *** 6.42 0.326 *** 7.28 0.326 *** 7.28 Exports
(bilateral) 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.040 0.039
0.039 *** 3.10 0.031 ** 2.43 0.030 ** 2.37 0.047 *** 3.63 0.047 *** 3.63 Distance
(no. Of time-zone) 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.014
0.352 *** 0.328 ** 0.327 ** 0.400 *** 0.400 ***
Euro area
0.121 0.134 0.134 0.138 0.132
-0.338 *** -3.59 -0.421 *** -3.31 -0.467 ** -3.70 -1.427 *** -13.38 -1.427 *** -13.38
Per capita GDP
0.129 0.157 0.202 0.436 0.401
0.600 *** 2.99 0.454 ** 3.03 0.395 ** 2.65 0.000 0.00
Bank credit / GDP
0.174 0.205 0.200 0.284
-0.124 -0.69 0.123 0.69 0.250 1.38 1.048 *** 5.51 1.048 *** 5.51 Stock Market Capitali-
zation / GDP 0.191 0.239 0.277 0.365 0.300
-0.055 *** -2.29 -0.074 *** -1.75 -0.074 ** -1.74 -0.139 *** -3.62 -0.139 *** -3.62
Inflation
0.019 0.027 0.030 0.039 0.038
-0.237 ** -3.70 -0.437 *** -5.09 -0.529 *** -6.21 -0.841 *** -9.77 -0.841 *** -9.77 Average Total Assets
(log value) 0.095 0.138 0.165 0.191 0.190
0.141 *** 3.02 0.127 *** 2.81 0.142 *** 3.12 0.284 *** 5.91 0.284 *** 5.91
Cash Flow
0.034 0.036 0.044 0.062 0.059
0.008 1.31 0.009 1.39 0.001 0.21 -0.058 *** -10.99 -0.058 *** -10.99
Non-Interest Income
0.006 0.006 0.015 0.020 0.019
0.484 ** 2.15 0.045 0.21
Return on Assets
0.203 0.335
0.010 0.77 0.086 *** 7.71 0.086 *** 7.71
Overheads
0.019 0.026 0.025
-0.111 -1.53 -0.610 *** -8.64 -0.610 *** -8.64
NIR – Net Charge Offs
0.174 0.211 0.197
0.106 3.66 0.106 3.66 Efficiency of Judicial
System 0.080 0.066
-0.458 *** -2.48 -0.458 *** -2.48 Restrictions on bank-
ing 0.121 0.103
1.222 *** 5.60 1.222 *** 5.60 State-owned Banks
0.396 0.394
No. Of Observations 3,861 3,289 3,289 3,289 3,289
Observed Prob. 7.43 7.81 7.81 7.81 7.81Table 10
The Choice of the Where to Expand Abroad
(robustness check)
The last row of each column refers to the coefficient of the variable in the column title. The empirical model in equation (2) has been
estimated using a random effect probit specification, where the dependent variable equals one if a bank of country j has a foreign
subsidiary in country i ≠ j and zero otherwise, and the random effect has been calculated with respect to the investing bank. We have
restricted our analysis to the 143 banks that have at least one shareholding abroad. Multiplying the number of banks in our sample by
the number of OECD countries, except Luxembourg, we have obtained pairs of bank-country observations, which constitute our re-
gression sample in Panel A. Panel B is obtained by further excluding Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, for which some
data are not available (see Table 5). ROA is defined as income after tax as percentage of total assets. Net interest margin (NIR) minus
net charge-offs and cash flow (defined as equity minus fixed assets and loan loss reserves) are expressed as percentages of total as-
sets. Overheads and non-interest income are expressed as percentages of the sum of net interest margin and non-interest income. To-
tal assets are expressed in billions of dollars. Market concentration is computed by the Herfindhal index. Data on inflation, GDP and
population are from IMF, International Financial Statistics (1998). Stock market capitalization and liquidity are from IFC, Emerg-
ing Stock Markets Factbook (1998). Exports and direct investment are from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (1998). Bilateral ex-
ports and direct investment are expressed as percentage ratio of destination country’s GDP. All data are calculated as the average
value of 1994-1997 figures. “Efficiency of judicial system” is taken from La Porta et al. (1998); “Restrictions on Banking” and
“State-Owned Banks’ are taken from Barth et al. (2000); “Restrictions on inward Foreign Direct Investment” is our computation
based on IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (1997).  Standard errors are reported in italics. The symbol ***
indicates a significance level of 1 per cent or less; ** between 1 and 5 per cent; * between 5 and 10 per cent.
All Countries, except  Luxembourg, Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland




































0.313 *** 0.332 *** 0.344 *** 0.321 *** 0.336 *** 0.197 *** Exports
(bilateral) 0.047 0.040 0.052 0.039 0.045 0.045
0.397 *** 0.377 *** 0.399 *** 0.436 *** 0.398 *** 0.411 *** Distance
(no. Of time-zone) 0.132 0.137 0.132 0.141 0.132 0.136
0.044 *** 0.048 *** 0.051 *** 0.045 *** 0.040 * 0.039 ***
Euro area
0.015 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.021 0.014
-1.331 *** -1.266 *** -1.445 *** -1.449 *** -1.429 *** -1.574 ***
Per capita GDP
0.442 0.485 0.403 0.403 0.401 0.417
1.010 *** 1.172 *** 1.087 *** 1.040 *** 1.039 *** 1.173 *** Stock Market Capitali-
zation / GDP 0.310 0.365 0.309 0.300 0.301 0.319
-0.131 *** -0.129 *** -0.141 *** -0.145 *** -0.138 *** -0.164 ***
Inflation
0.042 0.042 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039
-0.817 *** -0.861 *** -0.819 *** -0.827 *** -0.847 *** -0.907 *** Average Total Assets
(log value) 0.196 0.193 0.193 0.190 0.191 0.202
0.273 *** 0.271 *** 0.287 *** 0.294 *** 0.286 *** 0.267 ***
Cash Flow
0.062 0.062 0.059 0.060 0.059 0.061
-0.054 ** -0.056 *** -0.060 *** -0.057 *** -0.058 *** -0.067 ***
Non-Interest Income
0.021 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.021
0.082 *** 0.083 *** 0.087 *** 0.087 *** 0.087 *** 0.096 ***
Overheads
0.027 0.026 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.026
-0.602 *** -0.622 *** -0.593 *** -0.603 *** -0.628 *** -0.645 ***
NIR – Net Charge Offs
0.198 0.198 0.199 0.196 0.202 0.207
0.102 0.071 0.098 0.129 * 0.109 0.099 Efficiency of Judicial
System 0.067 0.089 0.068 0.073 0.066 0.068
-0.453 *** -0.440 *** -0.451 *** -0.453 *** -0.472 *** -0.458 *** Restrictions on bank-
ing 0.103 0.107 0.104 0.104 0.108 0.108
1.173 *** 1.161 *** 1.272 *** 1.333 *** 1.220 *** 1.568 ***
State-owned Bank
0.405 0.408 0.408 0.423 0.394 0.416
-0.500 -0.196 -0.035 0.090 0.033 0.105 ***
0.970 0.329 0.066 0.123 0.077 0.026
No. Of Observations 3,289 3,289 3,289 3,289 3,289 2,813References
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